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Introduction 
This essay will reflect on the meaning of life as a gift from God and the 
connection this giftedness has to the question of assisted suicide and euthanasia. 
In particular, it will be a response to the arguments on legitimizing euthanasia put 
forth by Dick Westley in his book When it's Right to Die: Conflicting Voices, 
Difficult Choices. 
Our American society is in the midst of a great cultural debate over the 
morality of persons asking for assistance in the act of killing themselves. Many 
people are also wondering if traditional taboos against killing others out of the 
motive of mercy ought to be removed as well. In the case of assisted suicide, the 
law courts seem split. In the minds of some judges they have found a firm basis for 
allowing physician assisted suicide under the fourteenth amendment 
(Washington State), to others, such as New York state judge Thomas Griesa 
there is no such basis. 1 
The Catholic church has weighed in heavily against assisted suicide and 
euthanasia because the teaching of the church does not see that human life is 
strictly autonomous from God, but rather places it in the context of the 
theonomous. By this, the church means that the human person participates in the 
life and wisdom of God through his or her own will and reason2• Life is intimately 
connected to and sustained by the Divine. If one holds this belief, it follows that 
there are ethical ramifications regarding the disposition of human life. In the view 
of those who hold a theonomous stance toward human life, persons are not at 
liberty to simply take their own lives or the lives of other persons, no matter the 
level of suffering. 
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This position can seem impervious to compassion. However, faith expresses 
compassion by abiding with the sick and dying, not by facilitating their demise. In 
his book, Westley argues that the Catholic church has misconstrued its basic 
principle that human life is a gift from God. He argues that God cannot give us 
our lives and then restrain us from autonomous intelligent choices regarding their 
disposition. He holds that the church is contradictory when it teaches that life is a 
gift from God and yet places constraints on what one can do with that gift. 
Westley wonders if our lives are really gifts, free and clear, or if they are simply on 
loan from God. 
I. Westley's Question: Is Life a Gift or a Loan? 
Westley argues that the church's position on euthanasia and assisted suicide 
needs to be changed in order to allow for the legitimate taking of life in certain 
circumstances of grave illness. He does not want to abrogate the teaching against 
euthanasia and assisted suicide but simply argue for its "emendation".3 
Practically speaking, however, the emendation he has in mind would reverse the 
teaching of the church which rejects the licitity of taking one's own life due to 
suffereing and sickness. As a basis for his emendation Westley critiques a 
statement made by the u.s. Catholic Bishops' Pro-life committee in Nutrition 
and Hydration: Moral and Pastoral Reflections (1992). The statement reads: 
"Our Church views life as a sacred trust, a gift over which we are given 
stewardship and not absolute dominion."4 
Westley believes that the Bishops logically contradict themselves by 
juxtaposing gift with stewardship. According to Westley, a gift is something 
received by the benefactor without further regard for the donor's intent or 
purpose. 
Either life is given to us by God as a gift, in which case it is ours and ours unconditionally, 
or we are given life the way the servants were given money in Luke 19: 11-27: It was 
never truly given but merely temporarily entrusted to them. In that case, our life is really 
God's and we only have it on something akin to inter-library loan.5 
While Westley's logic may seem compelling, the fact is that God not only gives 
our lives to us but also continues to be intimately involved in guiding those lives 
to a purpose which God has deemed worthy of our dignity.6 Is this continued 
involvement in directing the purpose of human life an intolerable intrusion into 
how an individual utilizes that gift? We do not see it as such. 
Westley does not argue that persons have "unconditional" dominion over the 
lives of others. No, we are to exercise "responsible stewardship" toward their 
lives.7 However, he does argue that for oneselfthe gift oflife is unconditional due 
to God's confidence and faith in humankind. Westley holds human freedom and 
reason in high esteem and wants the glory of the human person to be seen in acts 
of real freedom and sound delineration. 
34 
We would be very small indeed were we simply stewards charged with nothing more than 
ten~g our lives in obedience to and on behalf of the One who really owned them .. . 
Our lives are our own and, hence, at our disposaJ.8 
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We want to respond to Westley's vision of human autonomy by explicitly 
approaching two questions which seem to be implicit in his argument. First, can 
one be free and be obedient? And secondly, in receiving a gift does one receive 
from the donor the right to unconditional dominion over its use and purpose? 
D. Freedom and Obedience 
Westley is right in holding that the dignity of humankind inheres in our freedom 
and reason. And he is also correct in defending an understanding offreedom and 
reason which protects them from being reduced to some form of slavish 
obedience. However, it has long been a position within the Church that human 
freedom and reason only truly flourish and reflect human dignity when the 
person who exercises these faculties does so out of a dependency upon God. To 
argue as Westley does that our "lives are at our disposal" appears to advocate an 
extreme autonomy over the self, which doesn't just "emend" the Catholic 
tradition of Christian anthropology and metaphysics but would revolutionize it. 
The Catholic moral tradition, as officially expressed through the ordinary 
magisterium, has rejected euthanasia and assisted suicide as acts contrary to the 
grateful response due to God which is at the heart of moral living. 
The Church holds a paradoxical sense of freedom and reason in a context of 
dependency and obedience. As the Second Vatican Council teaches: 
For God willed that man should 'be left in the hand of his own counsel' so that he might 
of his own accord seek his creator and freely attain his full and blessed perfection by 
cleaving to him. Man's dignity therefore requires him to act out of conscious and free 
choice, as moved and drawn in a personal way from within, and not by blind impulses in 
himself or by mere external constraint .. . Since human freedom has been weakened by 
sin it is only by the help of God's grace that man can give his actions their full and proper 
relationship to God.9 
In this passage the full paradox of human freedom and obedience is laid out. It 
seems that Westley emphasizes only the diginity of the person's ability "to be left 
in the hand of his own counsel." However, this personal freedom in searching for 
the truth only attains its goal by obedience to and dependency upon the divine. 
Persons become fully human not by claiming autonomy from the Giver of life, 
but by "cleaving to him." We also attain knowledge of how to live, which 
includes decisions about when to dispose oflife, by being "moved and drawn in a 
personal way from within and not by blind impulse or ... external constraint." 
Within this reference to one being personally "from within" is an allusion to 
conscience which was described by the Council as the voice of God. 10 
The way to liberty is not to be found in asserting one's independence from God 
but in listening raptly (obeying) to God's voice in conscience. It is not blind 
obedience {"blind impulses,"),l1 nor authoritarianism ("external constraint") 
which leads to the truth about moral behavior but an openness to God in 
obedience. In an attempt to protect the good of human freedom and intelligence 
Westley pushes too far in the direction of autonomy. Westley, in Hans Urs von 
Balthasar's words, has succumbed to the temptation to flee from the absolute 
norm. 
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The first temptation fears its own freedom . .. I would rather renounce it and leave it all 
to (God). And this is the content of my prayer: that (God], not I, take charge of my 
decisions .. . The second temptation fears interference. It fears the origin will meddle 
with his own free gift. If I am supposed to exercise responsibility for myself ... I cannot 
be expected to be forever looking over my shoulder at some alien rule . .. This is the ethic 
of flight from the absolute norm, an ethic which holds that the very freedom we owe to 
our origin cannot coexist with Him (God).12 
A more balanced mode of protecting freedom and intellect can be found in the 
formation of conscience according to the truth. In Christianity the truth is a 
person, Jesus Christ, and so to radically isolate the ill person from relatedness to 
God by considering human life to be completely under one's own dominion l3 is 
to negate the very source of liberty: knowing the truth in Jesus. It is only in the 
paradoxical tension between gift and dependency that the dignity of human 
persons can be worked out. In relaxing this tension, as Westley does, in order to 
favor the promotion of autonomous thinkng regarding the disposal of one's own 
life, an aberrational understanding of human freedom, understood as separate 
from divine influence, is fostered. 
But to understand why this is so, we need to recall three points of 
contemporary Christian teaching. The first is that human being is an instance of 
created being which is by that fact contingent being. The second teaching is that 
human being is personal being which is by that fact intrinsically relational being. 
The third teaching is that it is precisely this intrinsically relational quality by 
which the human being is created in the image and likeness of the Triune God. 
The upshot of these three points is that the Persons of the Trinity themselves are 
not autonomous in the way that Westley claims for human beings. We consider 
very briefly each point in tum. 
(1) For the Catholic faith, the radical distinction between God and creatures 
implies that contingency is inseparable from creaturely status. In Thomistic 
tradition only God is His own being. Everything else that is real receives its being. 
Contingency, and moreover, a contingency that is continuous, belongs to the 
essence of creaturehood. This is not a covert way of arguing that God alone is real 
and that creatures have no reality over against Him. It is only to say that the 
creature's very real, though limited, being is continously dependent upon God's 
own willing to be of this limited being. When Westley claims that "our lives are at 
our disposal," he appears to be speaking at one and the same time in the 
indicative and imperative mood. He appears to be claiming a factual autonomy 
of the self over the self which is simply and radically at odds with the facts as 
understood by the Catholic faith. (And if in Catholic morality "the imperative is 
rooted in the indicative," there can be no "imperative" of radical human 
autonomy in the question of the direct termination of our own lives when the 
necessary conditions of specifically creaturely existence reduce such claims to 
posture and imposture.) 
(2) Turning to the question of human being as relational being, we would first 
acknowledge W. Norris Clarke's point that all being is in some sense intrinsically 
relational. In an article entitled "Person, Being, and St. Thomas," he states that 
both substantiality and relationality are primordial modes of being. He writes: 
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It turns out, then, that relationality and substantiality go together as two distinct but 
inseparable modes of reality. Substance is the primary mode, in that all else, including 
relations, depend on it as their ground. But since "every substance exists for the sake of its 
operations," as St. Thomas has just told us, being as substance, as existing in itself, 
naturally flows over into being as relational, turned towards others by its self-
communicating action. To be is to be substance-in-relation.14 
Approaching more directly the question of personal being, it should be noted 
that the classical emphasis has been placed in explicating the classical definition 
"individual supposit of a rational nature." The emphasis has been placed on what 
is incommunicable and substantial. Yet the Christian tradition has also 
considered relationality as constitutive of personhood. If it is true that all being is 
relational, it can be argued that being as personal is essentially marked by a 
special i.e., universal relatedness. The grounds of this universal relatedness are 
found in the rational creature's capacity for abstraction. We remember that the 
person as rational is in at least potential relationship with anything that is 
intelligible and is likewise in at least potential relationship with anything that 
appears to him or her as intelligibly good. This is the meaning behind Aristotle's 
cryptic remark about the human soul being "in some measure everything." 
Josef Pieper, cited in Clarke's essay, explicitly draws together the 
incommunicable and the relational aspects of personal being. He writes: 
The higher the form of intrinsic existence, the more developed becomes the relatedness 
with reality, also the more profound and comprehensive becomes the sphere of this 
relationship: namely, the world. And the deeper such relations penetrate the world of 
reality, the more intrinsic becomes the subject's existence . .. These two aspects 
combined-dwelling most intensively within itself, and being capax universi, able to grasp 
the universe-together constitute the essence of the spirit. Any definition of spirit will have 
to contain these two aspects as its core. IS 
(3) We turn to the question of the human as God's image and likeness. Westley 
could have pointed to Aquinas's prologue to question la2ae in which the point is 
made that human beings are made in God's image and likeness because they are 
masters of their own acts. One could develop this remark of Aquinas's by arguing 
that just as God is sovereign so humans, made in His image and likeness, are 
called to a like sovereignity. Including, one supposes, a like sovereignity over 
matters of life and death. 
Yet Aquinas's notion of the human being made to the image and likeness of 
God is more complex than this. Behind the sheer power to determine one's action 
lies the source of such power; namely, the activities of knowledge and love. 
In speaking about the divine image in the human, Aquinas distinguished 
between the image of representation and the image of conformity. In the image of 
representation, the soul knows and loves itself in a manner analogous to the 
fashion in which God knows and loves himself. In the image of conformity, the 
soul knows and loves God in a manner analogous to the fashion in which God 
knows and loves God. The first image is in every human creature by its capacity 
for the immanent action of knowledge and love. The second is present only by 
grace and is perfected in the light of glory. It is realized not in detachment from 
God but is rather only present when human knowing and loving find their 
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ultimate point, object, and fulfillment in Him. In other words, the perfection of 
the Divine image in the human is realized not in sovereign freedom but in loving 
attachment. 
One sees this pattern manifested even in the life of the Godhead. Catholic faith 
teaches that although God is one in nature, He is three in person. The trinity of 
Persons must be understood in such a fashion as not to compromise the unity of 
the Divine nature. This has been traditionally handled by the teaching that the 
persons in the Trinity are persons by virtue of their relations of origin. That is to 
say that the Father is the Father only by reason of His relationship with the Son 
(generation). The Son is only the Son by reason of His relationship with the 
Father (filiation). The Spirit is the Spirit only by reason of His relation with the 
Father and Son (active and Passive spiration). The persons of the Trinity are 
subsistent relationships. We think of human persons as being persons who then 
have relationships. But Divine persons just are their relationships. And so, even in 
the Trinity, there is not the sort of sovereignity that Westley imagines for human 
persons. Persons are persons by virtue of their relationships as well as by virtue of 
their independence. 
m. Giving and the Donor's Intention 
Recalling that Westley favors a notion of gift which emphasizes its 
independent status from the donor's purposes he argues that our lives, as gifts 
from God, are under our complete dominion (78). In order to argue against this 
understanding of gift, Paul Camenisch's essay, which appeared several years ago, 
is helpful. 16 In that essay Camenisch does not deal directly with the issue of life 
being a gift from God, but his study provides a basis from which to draw 
inferences about this topic. He does make one brief remark regarding life as a gift: 
Finally we turn to life itself as a gift. Here again those who assert that it is a gift intend to 
say largely positive things about it .. . that we should be grateful to the giver of it; that it is 
still in some sense the giver's and so should not be abused or destroyed by us. 
Camenisch also points out the limitation of using gift language about human 
life. 
Here the recipient exists only by virtue of the gift, the recipient virtually is the gift. But can 
the gift and the recipient be one in the same? . .. If life is a gift, it is so in a limited or a 
unique sense .. . [The difficulties in using gift language to refer to human life] ought not 
compel us to abandon the otherwise useful language of gift,17 
To be sure any language about life being a gift is metaphorical in nature and is not 
a strict application. However, analogical or metaphorical language is used to 
m~r~ fully ex~ress a reality which cannot be simply captured discursively. Some 
legttlmate clalms can be made based on analogical thinking. 
Generally speaking when a gift is given and accepted the recipient's use of the 
gift is not radically severed from the donor's intention. It is commonly accepted 
that if one gives a gift to another, he or she has at least a general sense of what the 
donor proposes the recipient to do with it. Abiding by this intention is part of the 
fullness of gift exchange. At the least, it can be presumed, the donor does not will 
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the destruction of the very gift he or she presented in an effort to symbolize the 
self-offering of the donor to the recipient. The gift's destruction would hardly be 
showing grateful conduct toward the donor. 18 
Westley argues that gift and stewardship are incompatible models for 
understanding human life. Either one receives a gift which is defined as 
something given with no strings attached or one receives a loan that one is 
expected to use according to the specifications of the donor. 
A bit of reflection on the nature of a gift will help us to see what is wrong with 
this account of things. A gift is characterized as (1) gratuitous, (2) reflective of the 
heart and mind of the giver, (3) intended to effect and benefit the receiver and 
which calls for a response which will vary according to the nature of the gift 
received. 
Westley seems to locate the essential meaning of gift in the "right" to use the 
gift as one sees fit. The note of possession is essential. A gift is a transaction in 
which something which was "mine" now becomes "yours." 
This does not adequately distinguish a gift from something given in fair 
compensation. Mere transfer of ownership can be a matter of ajust wage, a right, 
and not a gift at all. Surely, close to the heart of the notion of a gift lies the idea that 
a gift is, first of all, something given freely. It is a question of something given to 
me which is precisely not my due. 
If we remember that God was under no necessity in creating (for there was no 
one to "owe" anything to), and if we likewise remember that creation is not an 
event of the past but an ongoing reality (since everything that is not God would 
fade into non-being the moment God ceased to will it to be), then we can say that 
our existence is not owed to us at all by God. We exist only as His ongoing gift. 
Secondly, a gift which remains a gift is always something which signals the 
disposition and character of the giver. If the disposition of the giver becomes lost 
to view then what was a gift becomes merely a possession. This is why things we 
have received as gifts remain important to us, not because we have exclusive 
rights to their use, or because of their monetary value, but because they signify the 
love of the one who gave. A gift ceases being a gift to us the degree to which the 
dispositions and heart of the giver become unimportant. 
Human life is a gift which is meant to teach us about the dispositions of the 
giver of life. He is essentially a giver. He did not and does not retain life within 
Himself. He would have the "right" to be the only reality but He wished matters 
otherwise. He is generous and calls us to a like generosity. To understand the gift 
quality of human life as an entitlement to unlimited dominion over the gift is to 
misunderstand the spirit in which it was given. It is to misunderstand the motives 
of the giver. It is to lose appreciation for life as a gift. 
Thirdly, a gift is meant to affect the receiver in a certain way which calls for a 
proportionate response. As the gift affects the receiver more inwardly, the 
response called for becomes at the same time more focused and more free. 
Let us say one gives his or her niece a flute for her birthday. It is a gift that calls 
for some acknowledgment of her uncle's thoughtfulness. It does not necessarily 
call for her to become a flutist. She may in fact have no talent for or interest in the 
flute. The gift is extrinsic to my niece and her own real dreams. She may use it as a 
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wall decoration if she pleases with no impropriety. 
But let us imagine that one had the capacity to give not flutes but the passion 
and talent for playing the flute. This would be a gift that would profoundly affect 
the whole personality of the recipient. There would be something in the nature of 
the gift received that would cry out for a musical response; let us say a sensitive 
and unique rendition Mozart's flute concerto number one. The recipient's 
distinctive gift (no previously existing rendition of Mozart's concerto number one 
ever caught his joy quite this way) could only find release in the act of playing. 
It will be apparent that the gift of musical talent is something that is more 
inward, closer to being an essential part ofthe personality (we do not say person) 
than is the gift of a flute. This gift calls for a determined (musical) response and yet 
the response called for is free and a matter of inspiration. 
Let us go further inward. Let us consider the gift that God has made to us -not 
of our talents, but of our very being. What sort of response is called for? 
The response that traditional spirituality gives to this question is adoration. We 
adore God precisely as we acknowledge Him to be the source of our very being. 
On the one hand, this response is demanded, not by the imperious will of a 
jealous God, but by the very nature of the gift itself. The gift of life demands of its 
own nature a proportionate response which is worship. On the other hand, this 
response will be the freest act possible for a human being because in this act we 
acknowledge, realize, and give thanks for all that we truly are. 
It will be evident to the Catholic reader that the only proportionate response to 
this gift of God is eucharist. It is an act of thanksgiving to God for his deeds of 
creation and redemption, effected in Jesus the Christ. It is also an act of sacrifice 
in which we, together with Jesus, offer our whole lives to the Father as the only 
possible response to His gift. 
The gift quality of the life that we receive from God does not call for an attitude 
of dominion. It calls for the eucharist where we offer our lives to God, not in 
secure possession, but in thanksgiving. 
Overwhelmed as we are, and understandably so, by our own impending 
illnesses and death, it is not without sympathy that one looks to Westley's 
argument and his compassionate motives. However, this compassion is at the cost 
of a faith component which is essential to human dignity; we derive our identity 
from the divine intimacy which creates and sustains us in love and which nothing 
can destroy (Rom. 8). Arguing that one can take his or her own life in the context 
?f g~eat sufferin~ and sickness raises the question of acting out of pride or, 
lromcally, despaIr rather than freedom, reason, and faith. Holding out suicide as 
th~ ultimate solution for the gravely ill appears as an acquiescence to despair, or 
pnde, no~ an act of dignity and faith. "In this unbearable suffering," the informed 
person mIght be ?eard to say, "God has left me, and so I must leave this life by my 
o,:"n hand. AllIS empty, burdensome and fearful". Or, pridefully, "God has 
WIlled that I be on my own. All is my decision." 
There are many pastoral issues surrounding the issue of assisted suicide and 
euth~nasia. Am~n.g th~m is the need to promote better pain management, 
hospIce care, a spmtuahty of the cross, and communal support for the sick so that 
they are not at the margins of life but near its sacred core. We cannot agree with 
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Dick Westley's interpretation of life as being completely under the person's 
dominion. In light of his argument for suicide and euthanasia for certain persons 
in certain conditions, to not be persuasive on this issue of dominion is to 
undermine the foundation for his work of "emendating" the tradition. Westley 
concludes his work by saying that "If the people of God find my position 
unacceptable, I will gladly reconsider."19 
These ideas are presented in the hope that Westley will reconsider his thinking 
on what human life as "gift" means in light of the enduring moral, and 
metaphysical bond between the divine donor and the human recipient. 
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